At the beginning of the spring semester, each of the Praxis fellows was asked to run a pen-and-paper workshop introducing the rest of the fellows and staff to a digital method. No screens, no code, just the low-tech materials needed to think through a concept with your hands.

The driving philosophy for my workshop came from a quote by Richard Bach: “We teach best what we most need to learn.” I found this a clarifying provocation because instead of asking myself thorny, stressful questions—What will I teach? What do I know well enough to even be able to teach? What will be interesting to the other fellows and staff?—I was able to begin with a simpler one:

What do I need to know?

That was easy. I need to know how to curate and organize works of literature into coherent clusters and how to present those clusters to an audience. The structure of my dissertation is somewhat unusual in that it isn’t organized into chapters based on individual authors—for example a chapter on Elizabeth Bishop, a chapter on the works of Ted Hughes, a third on Gwendolyn Brooks. Rather, my chapters are conceptually themed around three kinds of poems I believe to be undertheorized: poems written from the perspective of animals, poems mourning the death of an animal, and poems detailing an animal encounter. Because these are undertheorized categories, there is no obvious starting point, no established canon to lean on. One of the central challenges of this work is determining what poems to include and how to present them to a reader. Hence my workshop.

A Word Teeming with Life

I decided to begin with a brief etymological history. (Based on my previous blog post, you may sense that this is a common pattern for me, and you would be correct.) The word anthology can feel dead and tiresome, especially in the context of an English department, where it quickly becomes synonymous with The Norton Anthology of English Literature—the ubiquitous teaching tome that conjures up associations of imperialism, hierarchy, and canon-formation. But it felt important to go back to the original anthology, a word whose origins are quite literally teeming with life.

Anthology comes from the ancient Greek anthologia (ἀνθολογία), meaning “flower-gathering”—from anthos (ἄνθος), “flower,” and legein (λέγειν), “to gather or collect.” The word traces back to a specific act of curation: around 100 BCE, the poet Meleager of Gadara compiled what is considered the first true anthology, a collection of epigrams by forty-six Greek poets. He called it The Garland—Stephanos (Στέφανος)—and in his introduction, he compared each poet to a different flower, weaving them together into a literary wreath. From its very beginning, an anthology was never just a heap of texts. It was a garland—something deliberately woven, where the selection and arrangement were themselves creative acts.

I shared this with my fellow fellows to begin reframing the kind of work an anthology can do. The anthology is not a neutral container. It is an argument about what belongs together and why.

Aesop’s Fables

I then introduced the anthology-making exercise. I gave each pair of participants a set of eighteen Aesop’s fables—but only their titles and associated morals, printed on cards. I chose not to include the full text of the fables at the wise suggestion of Brandon Walsh, which saved on reading time and allowed me to include enough fables to make the anthologizing meaningful. Participants were asked to select, cluster, order, and title an anthology from this set of cards.

The decision to strip the fables down to title and moral started me thinking about metadata. In this exercise, what is normally considered metadata—the title, the summary moral—was itself the data, given that participants didn’t have the fables themselves to read. This necessarily informed how they constructed their anthologies. Several groups clustered the fables based on the morals, sorting them into thematic categories like greed, deception, or flexibility. But I noticed that these morals are open to interpretation. Given the cryptic nature of some of the fables, it is fully possible for a single fable to have several competing morals, all of which would in turn affect how it was categorized. Is “The Crow and the Pitcher,” a fable about a thirsty crow attempting to drink from a pitcher too narrow for its beak, about cleverness, persistence, or desperation? The answer depends on the anthologist, and each reading produces a different garland.

Titling conventions themselves proved significant. One participant (Shane, unsurprisingly) included only fables featuring dogs (and the dog-like) and titled his anthology “Canidae.” It made me realize how contingent such an anthology is on the metadata available. If the titles of the fables were different, if they foregrounded the morals rather than the characters, could such an anthology even exist? The exercise revealed something I hadn’t fully articulated before: that the categories we use to organize literature are not found but made, and they are made from whatever information is legible to us at the moment of sorting.

Wireframing

The second part of the workshop asked participants to take their anthology and imagine it as a website. Using markers and blank paper, each pair sketched wireframes for three pages: a homepage, a browse page, and a single fable page. The shift from editorial decisions to design decisions turned out to be more disorienting than I expected—and more productive. Suddenly the question was not just what belongs together but how does someone move through what belongs together.

One of the most interesting wireframes came from Shane, who designed a single fable page that presented two fables simultaneously. At the top left of the page, a small illustration accompanied the first line of “The Town Mouse and the Country Mouse,” reading right-side up. But the next line down was the last line of “The Fox and the Grapes”—printed upside down, beginning from the bottom of the page. The two fables were enmeshed, line by line, so that as you read downward through one fable you were also reading upward through the other, the right-side-up text and the inverted text meeting in the middle. Even the pairing was deliberate: the contentment of the country mouse set against the fox’s sour dismissal of what he cannot reach.

To sharpen the design conversation, I borrowed a technique I’d been advised to try (also from Brandon): after the initial wireframing round, I asked participants to create a deliberately bad wireframe, then swap it with another group to fix. It is easier to talk about good design in the context of bad design, and the exercise gave everyone a shared vocabulary. But Shane’s wireframe complicated things beautifully. The group that received it didn’t want to “correct” such a fun and original idea (and who could blame them?) Their fix was to simply present the two fables one after the other, essentially normalizing the layout. It was the responsible design choice. It was also, in some way, a loss. Watching it play out, I realized the exercise had surfaced a genuine tension at the heart of digital presentation: between accessibility and experimentation, between making something usable and making something that rewards a different kind of attention.

This, I think, is the crux of the digital anthology problem and the reason I designed this workshop. The editorial and the digital are never really separate; they shape each other. The way you organize a collection changes what kind of interface it demands, and the affordances of an interface change what kinds of organization are even possible.

Anthologies Reimagined

But why stop at a website? The wireframing exercise opened a door in my thinking that I’m still walking through. If an anthology doesn’t have to be a book—if it can be a website with its own navigation and architecture—then what else could it be? What would an anthology you could walk around in look like? What if it weren’t a book to flip through linearly but something more like a room in a house you could dwell in. Where the poems on the walls changed depending on which door you entered through, where proximity meant something, where you could sit with a cluster of texts the way you sit in a corner of a room?

I don’t have answers to these questions yet. But I think the workshop helped me understand why they matter. Meleager’s original garland of poems was a wreath, a circle with no fixed beginning or end and where each flower touched the ones beside it. Somewhere between the garland and the Norton, we flattened the anthology into a line. The digital gives us a chance to unflatten it, to think about what it means to arrange literature not just sequentially but spatially, relationally, experientially.

We teach best what we most need to learn. I walked into that workshop needing to think more carefully about how the structure of a collection shapes the experience of reading it. I walked out with eighteen fables, four very different garlands, a handful of good (and bad) wireframes, and a vision of an anthology as a room. That feels like progress.

I’m very belatedly joining the Praxis Fellows blog after more than a semester of meaning to write this post and not writing it. Let me start with the word that has been keeping me busy instead.

Prosopopoeia

Pro-so-po-PEE-a. It comes from the Greek prosopon (“face,” “mask”) and poiein (“to make”), and it means, roughly, to give a face to something that doesn’t have one—or more precisely, to give speech to something that cannot speak. (The Greek word for “make” is also where we get the word “poem”—literally “a made thing.”) When a poet makes a dead person talk, that’s prosopopoeia. When the poet makes the wind talk, or a river, or a nation— prosopopoeia. It’s one of the oldest tricks in the rhetorical toolkit, and one of the strangest: the fiction that things which have no voice—or rather, a voice which we are not accustomed to listening for—can be “given” one by the writer.

What I’d like to do in this post is walk through a few examples of prosopopoeia to give you a sense of why this figure fascinates me and why I think it matters so much.

A courtroom ghost

Let’s begin in a Roman courtroom. In 56 BCE, Cicero was defending a young man named Marcus Caelius Rufus against charges of political violence. Cicero’s strategy was to reframe the whole prosecution as the scheme of a scorned lover—Clodia Metelli, a powerful patrician widow who had been Caelius’s mistress. To discredit Clodia, Cicero did something audacious: he announced that he would summon from the dead her own ancestor, Appius Claudius Caecus—the famous blind censor who built the Via Appia, Rome’s first great road—and let him address her directly.

What follows is one of the most celebrated prosopopoeiae in classical rhetoric. Cicero assumes Appius’s voice directly and has him thunder at Clodia: Woman, what business have you with Caelius? What business with a young boy? The address is deliberately humiliating. The Latin word Cicero uses, “mulier” (“Woman!”), strips Clodia of her patrician dignity. The jurors know these are Cicero’s words, not Appius’s, but when placed in his mouth they take on, almost by alchemy, a new kind of power. Prosopopoeia, in this instance, is able to create a sense of moral authority, seemingly out of thin air.

A silent urn’s subversive speech

If the Cicero example shows prosopopoeia as a deliberate rhetorical strategy, Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian Urn” shows how the figure can be a force of destabilization—how the question of who is speaking can even become unanswerable.

You probably know the poem’s famous last lines: “Beauty is truth, truth beauty.” But here are the closing lines, in the version most modern anthologies print:

When old age shall this generation waste, Thou shalt remain, in midst of other woe Than ours, a friend to man, to whom thou say’st, “Beauty is truth, truth beauty,” —that is all Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.

With the quotation marks around the phrase “Beauty is truth, truth beauty,” it seems quite clear that the urn is given a chance to speak and offer its profound metaphysical proposition on the nature of beauty and truth. The trouble is that those quotation marks do not appear in transcripts of the poem made by Keats’s friends, nor do they appear in other printed versions. This has led to major critical disagreement over how much speech can really be attributed to the urn. Are the lines “Beauty is truth, truth beauty,” said by the urn with the rest attributed to the lyric speaker of the poem or is the urn meant to be saying the entirety of the last two lines? Without any quotation marks indicating who is saying what, is the “ye” in the final line addressing the speaker of the poem, the readers of the poem, the urn, or the painted figures on the urn itself?

The instability of the speaker gives way to an instability of tone. Is the statement about beauty and truth a profound metaphysical proposition? Or is it a comic overstatement representing the naive and narrow point of view of the urn? The shifting quotation marks across manuscripts and editions are the material trace of a question prosopopoeia always raises: when we give speech to something that cannot speak, whose voice are we really hearing? And how exactly are we meant to hear them?

The sled dog, the bee, and the pig

This is where my dissertation comes in. The first chapter focuses on what I’m calling “animal persona poems”—contemporary poems written from the perspective of nonhuman animals. These poems occupy a strange position relative to prosopopoeia. Strictly speaking, they’re dramatic monologues: a poet assumes a character and speaks as that character, the way Browning speaks as the Duke of Ferrara in “My Last Duchess.” But the character is a sled dog, or a bee, or a pig. And the fact that the character is an animal changes everything about how the ventriloquism works.

Consider Timothy Donnelly’s “Malamute,” from his collection The Problem of the Many (2019). The poem is written in long, winding, syntactically complex sentences—each stanza essentially one sprawling clause accumulating subordinate phrases. Every verse paragraph opens with the same refrain: “When I was a dog I pulled the sled with the other dogs.” That past tense is crucial. This isn’t a dog speaking in the moment; it’s a being that once inhabited a dog’s body and now reflects from some other vantage point. The dog pulled the sled with the other dogs “who didn’t know I didn’t know”—it conceals its disquiet, its not-belonging, while the elaborate syntax enacts an interiority far exceeding anything we’d attribute to a naturalistic animal consciousness. The poem doesn’t pretend to offer transparent access to a dog’s mind. It foregrounds its own artifice.

Or take “As Bee,” by Paula Bohince. Here the speaker is a bee—polite, reflective, stoically aware of its own brevity. “This is my first and only spring on earth. / I get it.” The bee wonders parenthetically about its own mother—”(did I have one?)”—which captures both biological reality (bees don’t have individual mothers in any meaningful sense) and deeper emotional uncertainty. What strikes me about this poem is the “As” in the title, which marks the poem as a performance, a speaking-as, not a speaking-from.

And there’s Margaret Atwood’s “Pig Song,” from You Are Happy (1974) which features a sequence called “Songs of the Transformed” in which nine speakers are animals who have been changed by “Madame.” The pig describes itself in grotesque imagery—”a greypink vegetable with slug / eyes, buttock / incarnate, spreading like a slow turnip”—and then turns on its captor: “Madame, this song offends you, these grunts / which you find oppressively sexual, mistaking / simple greed for lust.” The poem’s final lines crystallize something about prosopopoeia itself: “I am yours. If you feed me garbage, / I will sing a song of garbage. / This is a hymn.” The pig will mirror back exactly what it receives, and the mirroring becomes sacred utterance. The voice given to the degraded creature becomes the vehicle for its resistance.

The paradox

What connects all these examples—the Roman courtroom, the Grecian urn, the sled dog and the bee and the pig—is a shared paradox. Speaking for what cannot speak or what cannot be thought to speak is simultaneously an act of imaginative generosity and an act of appropriation. The voice that emerges always belongs to two speakers at once—the ostensible speaker (the ancestor, the urn, the animal) and the real one (the orator, the poet). And the uncertainty about whose voice we’re really hearing is prosopopoeia’s deepest feature.

For my dissertation, this paradox becomes especially charged when the subject is an animal. Animals do have voices—they bark and sing and grunt and click, not to mention the huge range of gestures and non-speech acts they perform. They communicate, even if we can’t fully understand what they’re saying. So the poet who writes in the voice of a dog or a bee isn’t conjuring speech from silence, the way Keats does with his urn. The poet is replacing one kind of utterance (the animal’s actual, opaque expressiveness) with another (human language). The animal already has a face. The poet is putting a new one on top of it. And the most interesting animal poems, I think, are the ones that know this—that build the awareness of their own ventriloquism into their formal structures.

More to come. My dissertation explores what happens to poetic language when it tries to cross the species boundary, and part of what excites me about being a Praxis Fellow is thinking about how digital methods might shape that inquiry—how you curate a corpus of poems, how you present and sequence them, and what it means to build a digital environment that lets readers encounter those poems rather than just read about them. In my next post, I’ll write about a workshop I recently ran in which participants assembled their own anthologies of Aesop’s fables and then designed pen-and-paper wireframes for how they’d present them as websites. Until then, thank you for reading.